Memetic algorithms are a type of genetic algorithms very valuable in optimization problems. They are based on the concept of "meme", and use local search techniques, which allow them to avoid premature convergence to suboptimal solutions. Among these algorithms we can consider Lamarckian and Baldwinian models, depending on whether they modify (the former) or not (the latter) the agent's genotype. In this paper we analyze the application of memetic algorithms to the NPerson Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (NIPD). NIPD is an interesting game that has proved to be very useful to explore the emergence of cooperation in multi-player scenarios. The main contributions of this paper are related to setting the ground to understand the implications of the memetic model and the related parameters. We investigate to which extent these decisions determine the level of cooperation obtained as well as the memory and the execution performance.
INTRODUCTION
Memetic algorithms emerge at the end of the 80s inspired both in the Darwinian natural evolution principles, and in the "meme" concept introduced by Dawkins (Dawkins 1976 ). Dawkins defines a "meme" as an information unit that reproduces with people's exchange of ideas. This term is the cultural evolution equivalent of the gene concept, and in the case of memetic algorithms case, it refers to the strategies used to improve individuals' knowledge or culture. Memetic algorithms are also called hybrid genetic algorithms, or genetic local searchers, and can be defined as a type of genetic algorithms, which introduces local search techniques carried out by each agent of the population individually. Thus, memetic algorithms combine exploration with exploitation abilities provided by the local search, and they reduce the premature convergence to local optima due to a better exploration of the solutions space. Thus, they are very efficient in optimization tasks, like multi-objective optimization (Knowles and Corne 2000) , combinatory optimization (Garg 2009 ), as well as other applications (Krasnogor and Smith 2003) .
The study of cooperation evolution in the Prisoner's Dilemma has been extensively studied by means of genetic algorithms, and classic strategies by many authors like Axelrod (Axelrod 1984) or Xin Yao (Yao and Darwen 1994) . The latter article has been used as a reference for the development of the experiments introduced in this paper. The main contribution in this paper is to explore the possibilities of memetic algorithms for simulating the NIPD. We investigate different scenarios for the game, and explore the possible combinations of algorithms and game parameters, that produce better outcomes from the cooperation point of view. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the some background necessary to understand this work. Section 3 presents a description of the memetic model used in the NIPD evolutionary game. Section 4 presents the results that allow us to analyze the performance of some memetic algorithms and the game conditions. Section 5 draws the conclusions obtained, and hints some possible future work we foresee from this point.
BACKGROUND
In this section we introduce several topics needed to understand the NIPD game, the model and the scenarios described in this paper.
N-Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (NIPD)
The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) consists on repeating successively a set of basic Prisoner's Dilemma games (Axelrod 1984) . Players take their decisions in each round considering a certain number of previous opponent' actions without knowing the number of rounds to be played. This prevents individuals from building their strategies depending on a certain time horizon. A strategy in the IPD is a rule to decide the next action depending on the previous history. The success of a strategy depends not only on that strategy, but also on the opponent's strategies. The basic 2-player IPD has been used to model several real-world problems. However, there are other scenarios that cannot be modeled with the 2-player IPD (2IPD). The N-player IPD (NIPD) is used to model situations where one player interacts with more than on opponent at the same time. In the NIPD game, each player can also choose between Cooperation (C) and Defection (D), but the selected strategy is used combined with the ones selected by the rest of the opponent2s. A possible payoff matrix for a N-Player IPD is shown in Table 1 , where in each iteration, each player receives a payoff that depends on its action and how many individuals have cooperated in a particular game iteration. 
Genetic Model
An individual's strategy determines which action will be performed in a certain situation. When using genetics, we can represent the strategy using a genome, i.e., an array of bits that specifies the decision to take in every possible context. We will base our work in the genotypic approach introduced by Xin Yao in (Yao and Darwen 1994). As Xin Yao et al. explain in their model, each individual is regarded as a set of rules stored in a look-up table that covers every possible history. As a game has an enormous number of possible histories, and as only the most recent steps will have significance for the next move, we only consider every possible history over the most recent h steps, where h is less than 4. This means that an individual can only remember the h most recent rounds. Such a history of h rounds is represented by:
1. h bits for the player's own previous h moves, where a "1" indicates defection, "0" cooperation 2. Another n-1 group of h.log(n) bits for the number of cooperators among the other n-1 players, where n is the number of the players in the game. This requires that n is a power of 2. For example, if we are looking at 8 players who can remember the 3 most recent rounds, then one of the players would see the history as: History for 8 players, 3 steps: 001 111 110 101 (12 bits) were the first 3 bits on the left represent player's own actions (see (Yao and Darwen 1994 ) for a detailed example). In this example we have 2 = 2048 possible histories, so the same number of bits are needed to represent all possible strategies. In the general case of an n-player game with history length h, each history needs h+h.log2 (n) bits to represent and there are 2 h+h.log 2 (n) of such histories. Since there are no previous h rounds at the beginning of a game, we need to specify them with another h. (1 +log2 (n)) bits. Hence each strategy is finally represented by a binary string of length h+h.log2 (n) + h. (1 +log2 (n) ). The different strategies used by the players, and represented by this model, form the genetic diversity of the experiment. Introducing other factors, like mutations, increases this genetic diversity. The measurement of this diversity can be very important to analyze genetic algorithms, and can be used as a finishing condition when the genetic diversity falls below a certain threshold. There are many methods to measure this diversity, e.g., the entropy, the Hamming distance, and the moment of inertia. In (Morrison and De Jong 2002) Morrison and De Jong showed that the moment of inertia obtains the same results to measure diversity than the Hamming distance, but with a much lower computational cost, and it is the approach that we use in this paper.
Memetics: Lamarckian and Baldwinian Models
Memetics follow a process similar to genetic algorithms. Both keep a population of different solutions to the problem considered, and perform processes of evaluation, selection, crossover and mutation. However, memetics incorporate the novelty of a local search performed by each individual. This new feature implies that individuals can find individuals fitter than themselves who are close to them in the search space. The Lamarckian model (Nghia et al. 2009 ) is based on the fact that the improvements found in the local search process are assimilated by the individual, transmitting the positive characteristics directly to the offspring. This means that the fittest neighbor found substitutes the original candidate. This model is applied along with the traditional mutation operator after the processes of evaluation; selection and crossover have been made. On the contrary, the Baldwinian model (Castillo et al. 2006 ) only changes the individual's fitness, and the improved genotype does not become part of the population. This is, learnt behaviors are not transmitted directly to the offspring. Instead they are transmitted in an indirect way incorporating them in the fitness value. Therefore, it can be seen as a search for those individuals that could produce the fittest children, this means the best potential solutions to the problem. This process is carried out generating through mutation a predefined number of descendants. Each one of them competes against the N-1 rivals and the best fitness obtained is assigned to the parent. This process represents learning and improvement of an individual.
Spatial and Panmitic Populations
The populations considered in this paper are organized in panmitic or spatial networks. In panmitic scenarios each individual can interact with any individual of the population. Spatial networks (Knowles 2000) are a collection of nodes connected by links, with a certain relation determined by the spatial proximity among them. Each node, representing a certain player, is connected to a group of other nodes, i.e., neighbors that form its neighborhood. Therefore, neighborhood is set by a radius that defines the maximum distance a neighbor can be. This configuration represents relationships conditioned by proximity, and it is related with regular graphs. The use of a spatial organization of the population has been studied in different studies of the Prisoner Dilemma using 2 players (Nowak and May 1993), using the classic game (Schweitzer et al. 1997 ), using classic strategies (Nakamaru et al. 1997) or analyzing factors like the influence of the payoff matrix or the cooperation evolution. An example of these networks can be seen in Figure 1 . 
The Island Model
Despite how helpful evolutionary algorithms can be, there are still problems that require a great amount of execution time. Parallel programming techniques have been developed to tackle this limitation. Parallel evolutionary algorithms can run several genetic algorithms at the same time using small populations, solving this way a problem of higher complexity and reducing the time to wait for a result. The Island Model is a type of parallel evolutionary algorithm consisting of dividing a large population into smaller subpopulations or islands. Each of these islands is an initial population of an evolutionary algorithm, which is executed in parallel. In this model each of these islands have the possibility of exchanging the best individuals (distributed system), or not exchanging anything (partitioned system). The movement between different islands receives the name of migration. Migrations exploit the differences between the different subpopulations, since as all of them start with different initial populations, convergence will take different paths in each of them. The number of migrations is a point to consider, since a migration of a large number of individuals implies a reduction in the global diversity, and therefore removing the differences among islands. On the contrary, when the migration rate is too low it could lead to an early convergence of the subpopulations.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
The algorithm used in our simulations starts with an initialization process where an initial population is created. After this initialization, the evaluation and breeding take place until diversity is too low or a maximum number of iterations is reached. After the evaluation and breeding processes there is an optional phase of exchange, used in the Island model, where individuals are exchanged between islands.
The agents will play NIPD games using one of the memetic models described in Section 2. Each generation plays several rounds selecting N random players. If we are in a Baldwinian model we generate a certain number of descendants to compete against the rivals, and we assign the best fitness obtained to the parent without modifying the genotype. In case of a Lamarckian model in this point the game is played naturally between the agent and its opponents. Once all the individuals are evaluated, and have their fitness calculated according to the Payoff matrix described in Table 1 , the breeding process starts. This stage consists of a process of selection, crossover and mutation.
To select the breeding parents we use the roulette selection. This method selects N individuals randomly (one individual may be selected more than once). After this selection only the individual with the best fitness will be chosen (or the worst fitness if configured with that criterion). The Island model is introduced in three different places. Before the selection and modification stage there is a new process that extracts individuals from each Island and stores them in a remote process. After the breeding stage other process is in charge of introducing the extracted individuals in the corresponding islands. Lastly, there is a last process in charge of checking if the simulation must be stopped because one of the parallel islands has found the individual wanted. The Island Model used in this paper considers each island a subpopulation of the initial population and all the subpopulations must reach an end separately. The methods used to select the individuals sent to other islands, and the individuals removed when others arrive from other islands, are Tournament and Random selection respectively.
RESULTS
This section presents and analyzes the results obtained in the experiments performed with our model.
Experimental Settings
The parameters used in the simulations are indicated in Table 2 , unless otherwise indicated. When there is no spatial distribution considered, the population distribution will be by defect panmictic, i.e., each individual can interact with any other. 
Lamarck vs. Baldwin Comparative
In this section we will study the differences between the Baldwinian and the Lamarckian models, analyzing the influence of parameters related to the memetic local search process. Figure 2 offers a representative result of our comparatives among Baldwinian, Lamarckian and genetic payoffs for different number of players and history sizes. It can be seen that the Balwinian algorithm obtains a level of cooperation over 90%. However, Lamarckian and genetic algorithms can only reach much lower levels. In the Lamarckian case this is due to the fact that changes in the population are introduced continuously with new and random individuals, which implies an increase in the population diversity. Thus, while in the Baldwinian model population diversity decreases more and more until in the end, when cooperative strategies dominate; in the Lamarckian model it cannot be reduced to the same extent. This diversity reduction can be seen more clearly in Figure 3 . In our simulations we have found that the Baldwinian and the Lamarckian models seem to be more useful than simple genetic algorithms in cooperation evolution. They show a better performance in some cases due to the memetic local search. Considering the results summarized by these figures, the following experiments will make use only of the Baldwinian model, since the Lamarckian one introduces a higher level of population diversity, which could be an advantage in other studies (Nghia et al. 2009 ), but that does not lead to a better performance in the case of evolutionary algorithms in dynamic environments like the ones used in this paper.
Influence of the Number of Players
The first parameter that requires analysis is the influence of the number of players that participate in the NIPD game. To study this parameter we have used a Baldwinian model with a 2 plays History where we analyze how the cooperation level changes when the number of players varies.
In the next figures we have represented in the x axis the number of generations and average payoff in each generation in the y axis. Since the graphs are associated to different y axis values, we have also included two reference level marks so that they can be more easily compared. These levels refer to the 80% and 90% of the maximum value that can be obtained, when all the individuals cooperate. In Figures 4 and 5 it can be seen that as the number of players increase, reaching a certain level of cooperation becomes increasingly harder. The 80% of cooperation is reached rapidly in both cases, but the as the group becomes larger it becomes more difficult to reach a level over 90%.
The average number of cooperators and defectors per round and generation is therefore affected by the number of players involved. This result matches the conclusions obtained by Xin Yao in (Yao and Darwen 1994) .
Influence of the Number of Mutations
Each time an individual is evaluated, it is mutated x times. Each one of those mutations is mutated again another x times until a parameterized number of generations. In Figure 6 we present a comparative of the payoff obtained with different number of mutations and generations.
The results show that the 8 mutations and 2 generations case obtains better results. Despite reaching the 90% cooperation level in all cases, the highest values are obtained faster when the number of mutations evaluated is higher. This is explained by the fact that in the case with more mutations and generations, the local search takes into account more possibilities. 
Influence of the History Size
As the number of actions remembered and the number of players increases, the individual's genotype becomes bigger according to the explanation in Section 2. Thus finding a suitable value is important since it affects the execution time and the memory used. In Figure 7 we can see that with a memory of only 1 play the results are quite satisfactory with a cooperation level between 80 and 90%. The best results are obtained with 2 and 3 plays, but when the memory size is increased over 3 plays the performance is becoming to be impaired. These results are explained by the fact that with one play the information is insufficient to decide the most convenient action to take. With 2 or 3 plays an individual can act taking into account more actions and avoiding misjudging the opponent. However, when the memory size is greater than 3 individuals can take into account defections occurred a long time before the current play. Besides, as the number of combinations becomes higher, the genotype size becomes larger too. This means that the population diversity is increased as well. These two factors contribute to impair the cooperation as the history size increases. The previous experiments have considered only panmitic populations. Figure 8 shows the influence of using a spatial organization to select the users' opponents instead of allowing connections with any user of the population.
As it can be seen in figure 8 , in the case of a population organized in neighborhoods cooperation appears faster, reaching the 90% level many generations before than in the panmictic case. Figure 8 shows a superposition of 10 simulations with 8 players and 2 plays history for random (left) and spatial distributions (right). These results show that after 1000 generations, in the random distribution case not all the simulations reach the 90% while in the spatial case all of them do it. Despite organized networks render better results, as it has just been seen, there are certain experiments in which the cooperation is not increased. This happens in those cases where a high level of cooperation is already reached with a panmitic distribution and therefore it becomes difficult to improve even introducing a spatial organization (e.g. the example shown in the Influence of History Size subsection).
We have selected individuals in spatial networks using methods like best neighbor selection, selection by tournament between the individual's neighbors and substitution by the best neighbor after an evaluation. Figure 9 shows a comparative of these methods in a 4IPD with 1 play memory size game. The results show that both the best neighbor selection and the substitution by the best neighbor perform well, while the tournament selection is the one that shows the worst performance. An important subject in Spatial Networks is the neighborhood size. Figure 10 shows how this parameter affects the performance of a 5IPD with a history size 2 and 3 respectively in a 10x10 spatial population. Analyzing these graphs it is possible to conclude that the smaller the neighborhood, the easier the cooperation can thrive. This result also agrees with the conclusions of Xin Yao (Yao and Darwen 1994) . 
The Island Model
As we have seen in Section 2, the Island Model helps solving problems where the time of execution becomes a serious constraint. In this model the initial population is divided in subpopulations, where each one of them will evolve independently while every certain period of time they exchange individuals (migration).
Since the subpopulation initialization is random different results can be obtained in each subpopulation leading to differences in the evolution of cooperation among individuals. Besides, when the migration rate is too low, or there is none, islands work as independent simulation runs.
The following experiments have been done with groups of 4 players and a memory size of 3 plays with spatial distribution and using the best neighbor selection. The population will be organized in 4 subpopulations with identical characteristics and 100 individuals in each one of them. The parameters used are shown in Table 3 . Parameters like the number of islands a subpopulation sends individuals to and which are them, are determined by the topology of the model (Jovanovic et al. 2010 ) (Rucinski et al. 2010 ). Other parameters that we will change are the number of individuals exchanged, the generation to start exchanging, and the period between migrations. The moment when the migrations begin is important, since if it is too early the search is not aimed correctly yet and therefore the individuals exchanged will not be fit for the problem to evaluate. The effect of the migration rate and the topology on the cooperation can be seen in the following figures. In Figure 11 we can see that, as the migration rate is so low, each subpopulation evolves in the same way as if they were a unique independent population. Thus, in this case the migrations do not have a significant contribution to the evolution. Figure 12 shows the same simulation increasing the migration rate to 50% of the population (50 individuals). When the migration rate is so high the cooperation evolution is considerably affected, since every time that a subpopulation finds fit individuals they are removed from the island in a migration. Finally, in figure 13 we consider a star topology where the central island will be POP1 with a migration rate of 90%, while the other islands will have a 10% migration rate. In this case we can see that the central island does not reach high levels of cooperation while the other islands achieve good levels. This behavior is due to the fact that the migration rate is too high and we are introducing new individuals constantly in the central subpopulation. 
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have presented a brief study of memetics in NIPD analysing the influence of different factors that are crucial for the game evolution. We have seen the better performance of the Badwinian model over the Lamarckian one for the experiments considered. Thus we have selected the Baldwinian model to analyze the influence of several parameters. The memory size proved to be an important factor, since a size of a single play implies too little information and therefore a convergence to non-optimal solutions. Despite increasing this size improves the cooperation, a size too big means that the complexity of the algorithm grows dramatically leading to a worse performance. We have also seen that a number of players too high impairs the cooperation, and that a higher number of mutations applied to an individual helps the local search and therefore the speed of the process. We also analyzed the implications of organizing the population spatially in neighborhoods, and how big they must be. The results obtained showed that cooperation is favored in organized populations, performing better the smallest neighborhoods. Finally, we have seen how the usage of the Island model can be a good asset when dealing with large populations, but we must pay attention to the values of the migration rate, and the moment when it starts. Migrations should not start too early to avoid transitional states in the search, while a migration rate too high can imply a reduction in the cooperation levels. Future work will consider the use of more complex scenarios for the population network, and the use of different island topologies.
